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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The case comes on before this court on the appeals of 
William F. Bradley and Jackie R. Mattison following their 
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convictions for certain offenses in the district court at a 
two-month trial. We have consolidated their appeals and 
dispose of both in this opinion. 
 
Mattison was Chief of Staff for Sharpe James, the Mayor 
of the City of Newark, from approximately 1987 through 
early 1996, and was also a New Jersey State Assemblyman 
during that period. As Chief of Staff, Mattison acted as the 
Mayor's liaison between the City's Business Administrator 
and its department heads, ran the Mayor's office and 
agencies, served as liaison with the city council, boards and 
commissions, acted as the Mayor's representative at 
business meetings, and served as the Mayor's lobbyist in 
Trenton. The grand jury named Mattison's long-term 
girlfriend, Janice L. Williams, who was in the hair salon 
business, as an unindicted co-conspirator. Mattison and 
Williams together owned a house and shared a rented safe- 
deposit box. Moreover, Mattison opened bank accounts in 
Williams' name in trust for their daughter. During the 
course of the investigation in this case the FBI seized 
$157,000 in cash from lockboxes in Williams' house and 
evidence of that seizure was admitted at the trial. 
 
Bradley was an insurance broker/financial consultant in 
the late 1980s, running a business called Bradley Financial 
Services from an office in Milburn, New Jersey. Bradley had 
known Williams, through Mattison, for about 15 years at 
the time of trial. The evidence at the trial demonstrated that 
Mattison helped Bradley in his role as a consultant for two 
companies, Great West Assurance Company and Corroon & 
Black, to obtain and maintain contracts with the City and 
the Newark Board of Education. The City chose Great West 
as a provider of deferred compensation plans for City 
employees, and the Board of Education chose Corroon to 
provide insurance with Bradley as its minority 
subcontractor. 
 
There was evidence that Mattison provided Bradley with 
official favors with respect to those contracts in return for 
a series of corrupt payments from Bradley. In particular, 
Bradley gave two checks payable to Mattison to him, one 
for $4,457.50 in September 1990 and one for $1,640 in 
January 1991. Bradley labeled the first check "fees" and 
the second "consulting." Mattison deposited the first into 
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his personal bank account and cashed the second. Bradley 
made three checks payable to Williams for Mattison's direct 
and indirect benefit. The checks were for $3,600, dated 
October 8, 1991, $3,600, dated November 13, 1992, and 
$3,575, dated October 13, 1994. Williams deposited the 
first check into a new account she opened with the deposit 
but she added no other deposits to the account. She 
withdrew the entire balance in a check payable to cash on 
February 5, 1992. She deposited the second check into her 
personal checking account, and paid certain of Mattison's 
bills with it. She deposited the third check into her 
checking account and, over the next nine days, made cash 
withdrawals from the account for $2,000, $1,000 and $800. 
 
Thus, Bradley made total payments to Mattison of 
$16,872.50. Mattison did not reveal the receipt of these 
payments on financial forms he was required to file by 
reason of his public positions. Williams testified that the 
payments Bradley made to her were loans, and Bradley 
claimed that the first check he wrote to Mattison was a 
repayment of a loan. 
 
The government demonstrated that Mattison referred 
Bradley to Great West when it was seeking the contract to 
provide the City's deferred compensation plan. Bradley, in 
fact, became Great West's consultant. Mattison also 
furnished Bradley with information useful to Great West in 
seeking the contract and Bradley indicated to Great West 
that Mattison would aid it in winning the contract, which 
he did. Significantly, the assistance Mattison gave to 
Bradley included ensuring that a potential competitor did 
not offer a competing deferred compensation plan to the 
City. 
 
The evidence showed that the Newark Board of Education 
was selecting an insurance plan in 1989-90 to cover its 
buildings and other property. Under applicable rules, 
Corroon was required to have a minority contractor 
participating with it and Mattison vouched for Bradley for 
that role. Corroon paid Bradley an unusually high 
commission, but Bradley did little work to earn it. A search 
of Bradley's office revealed correspondence addressed to 
Mattison, some confidential, pertaining to the Board of 
Education contract. After Corroon secured the contract in 
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1990, Bradley was unable to obtain minority certification 
and lacked malpractice insurance necessary for him to 
comply with the contract. Nevertheless, through Mattison's 
intervention, Corroon decided to pay Bradley his 
commission in September 1991, despite initially stopping 
payment on a check to him. 
 
Bradley and Williams testified that the various money 
transfers related to loans, but the government argued that 
their explanations were not convincing. For example, 
Williams testified that her loans from Bradley had no terms, 
and that there were no written records kept about them. 
Bradley testified that his first check to Mattison was 
repayment for a loan Mattison had made to him to 
purchase a co-op, but evidence showed that he borrowed 
money for that purpose from a woman he was dating. While 
Bradley stated that he wrote "consulting" on that check so 
he could deduct it from taxes, he had not filed tax returns 
since 1989, leading to the tax evasion conviction in the 
case. Moreover, Bradley was in financial difficulties during 
this period and thus it is not likely that he would have been 
in a position to lend Williams money. Furthermore, while 
Williams stated the loans were for her hair salon business, 
the business was not in serious trouble, and she had funds 
available to her from a City program and in her own 
accounts. Also, in 1993 when Bradley sought a minority 
business certification he did not indicate that he had loans 
receivable as assets. 
 
A grand jury returned a 26-count superseding indictment 
against Mattison and Bradley. It charged both in counts 
one through 19 with: conspiracy to accept corrupt 
payments; accepting money to influence and reward; a 
scheme to extort money under official right, violating the 
Hobbs Act; use of a facility in interstate commerce to accept 
a benefit not allowed by law to influence the performance of 
Mattison's duties contrary to New Jersey law; and use of 
mail and wire fraud to deprive the citizens of Newark and 
New Jersey of their right to honest services of a public 
official. It charged Bradley separately in seven counts for 
three offenses: making a false declaration before the grand 
jury; false use of a social security number; and tax evasion 
from 1989-1993. 
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The court dismissed three jurors during and after the 
summations at the trial. The court dismissed the first, 
Moldow, to attend a family funeral. The court dismissed the 
second, Jefferson, one day later, for sleeping. The court 
dismissed the third because the juror had vacation plans. 
 
During the early stages of the trial, jurors mentioned that 
Jefferson had an odor problem and the court moved her 
seat so she was further away from the other jurors. Later 
the Assistant United States Attorney told the court he 
thought that Jefferson was eating paper. The jurors, 
however, did not make any subsequent complaints 
regarding odor problems or any other issue concerning 
Jefferson. When near the end of the trial Moldow brought 
her request to leave the jury to the court, she asked if the 
court would dismiss the other alternates. At that time the 
court asked her if there was something she wanted to tell 
it. Moldow then stated that she thought Jefferson, who was 
an alternate, was not a good listener and had made up her 
mind with respect to the outcome of the case. The court 
also asked if the odor issue continued. The court told the 
parties about the situation, and the court placed Moldow 
under oath for questioning. 
 
Moldow stated that near the start of trial, she had 
overheard Jefferson during lunch mutter a comment about 
making up her own mind and not listening to the court. 
Moldow said the remark shocked her and that she asked 
Jefferson what she had said, but that Jefferson denied 
saying anything. 
 
The court then told the parties that it had noticed 
Jefferson sleeping. It then swore in one of its law clerks, 
who testified that during the government's closing, she had 
noticed Jefferson sleeping. The defendants had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the clerk but did not do so. 
The court expressed its desire to question Jefferson, but the 
defendants opposed that procedure. The court then decided 
to delay questioning her in recognition of her status as an 
alternate. 
 
Ultimately the court dismissed the juror who had 
vacation plans. The court then stated that it had observed 
that Jefferson was not paying attention during the 
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defendants' summation. The defendants at that time 
changed their position, and urged the court to examine 
Jefferson. The court offered to voir dire all jurors about the 
comment Moldow overheard, but it did not do so. After 
further discussion, the court dismissed Jefferson without 
questioning her. We understand that if the court had not 
excused Jefferson she would have deliberated in this case. 
Eventually the jury convicted both defendants on all 
counts. 
 
The court calculated Mattison's guidelines range at 33-41 
months, and it sentenced him to 41 months imprisonment 
on each count to run concurrently, three years' supervised 
release on each count, also to run concurrently, 400 hours 
of community service, a fine of $25,000, and special 
assessment of $950. 
 
Bradley's guidelines range was 46-57 months, and the 
court sentenced him to concurrent 46-month custodial 
terms on each count, to three-year terms of concurrent 
supervised release, a fine of $7,500, and a special 
assessment of $1,300. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
   allowed the government to adduce evidence that 
   $157,000 was found in Williams' attic to impeach her 
   testimony. 
 
On this appeal Mattison has filed briefs in which Bradley 
has joined. The defendants argue that evidence of the 
$157,000 recovered from Williams was "highly 
inflammatory" and "unfairly prejudicial" and that the jury 
could not "compartmentalize" the evidence even with the 
court's limiting instructions. Brief at 22-23. They argue 
that while no effort was made to link the cash to Mattison, 
the evidence "powerfully suggested" that Mattison had 
something to do with it, as it was found in Williams' home. 
Id. at 23. 
 
The government called Williams as a witness following a 
grant of immunity to her. Testimony demonstrated that the 
FBI had found the $157,000 in cash in lockboxes in the 
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attic of her house during a November 9, 1995 search made 
in connection with the investigation against Mattison and 
Bradley. Williams claimed that she had found the money in 
her father's house a year after his death, on approximately 
October 24, 1995, and that she had not put the money in 
a bank because she was waiting to discuss the matter with 
a sister. The government stated that the evidence was 
admissible to impeach Williams' testimony that she had 
lent money she obtained from Bradley's first loan to her, in 
1991, for $3,600, to her father. In this regard, the 
government suggested that if her father had had so much 
money, he would not have borrowed from Williams. The 
government also contended that evidence of the money 
impeached her testimony that Bradley's three payments to 
her were loans as Williams did not repay Bradley at the 
time she found that money. Moreover, it argued that the 
evidence demonstrated that Williams' grand jury testimony 
that she withdrew $3,500 in cash in February 1992 for her 
father was false, and had to be changed at trial where 
Williams said she gave some money to her father and used 
some money for personal bills. 
 
The government had a legitimate reason to offer the 
evidence to attack Williams' credibility. The court gave 
limiting instructions to the effect that the evidence with 
respect to the $157,000 was admitted only to impeach 
Williams, and that the prosecution did not suggest that 
there was a connection between the cash, the defendants, 
and any crime. 
 
The court's decision to admit the evidence was proper. 
See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 973, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) 
("prejudice" entails a determination on "an improper basis 
of decision"). In making a Fed. R. Evid. 403 determination, 
the district court is required to balance the probative value 
of evidence against its prejudicial effect. The district court 
"must appraise the genuine need for the challenged 
evidence and balance that necessity against the risk of 
prejudice to the defendant." Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here 
evidence regarding the $157,000 had a legitimate purpose 
and there was not "an overwhelming probability" that the 
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jury would have been unable to follow the limiting 
instructions, or "a strong likelihood" that the evidence 
would be "devastating" to the defendants. United States v. 
Vaulin, 132 F.3d 898, 901 (3d Cir. 1997). In the 
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting it. 
 
B. Whether it was proper for the court to dismiss Jefferson 
   for sleeping without a voir dire of her. 
 
The defendants argue vigorously that the court erred in 
dismissing Jefferson. We review the court's actions in this 
regard for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1392 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The court had a legitimate basis to dismiss Jefferson. 
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c), a court may dismiss jurors if 
they "become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 
perform their duties." The defendants argue that the court's 
stated reason for dismissing Jefferson, that she was 
sleeping, was only a "pretext," and that the court and the 
government had singled her out and were looking for ways 
to remove her. But the record shows that the court 
dismissed her for inability to serve as a juror, and that the 
court had sufficient information to support the dismissal 
and so did not have to voir dire her or the other jurors with 
respect to this point. See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d at 1395; United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
The defendants downplay the fact that the court itself 
noticed Jefferson sleeping: first, when it overheard someone 
snoring loudly during the government's summation, then, 
when it observed Jefferson snoring during the defendants' 
summation; thus, its dismissal was not solely based on its 
law clerk's observations. The court could take judicial 
notice of the conduct of a juror in open court. See, e.g., 
United States v. Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1970). 
Moreover, the court did not base its decision on ex parte 
communications with its clerk. Rather, it put the clerk on 
the stand to be cross-examined. The defendants refused to 
question the clerk, and now argue that this is because they 
did not want to risk attacking the court through its 
extension, the clerk. Yet the defendants' attorneys were 
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quite willing to argue with the court itself regarding its 
observation that Jefferson was sleeping, and were willing to 
question whether the court had observed other jurors 
sleeping as well. Furthermore, when the court initially 
offered to voir dire Jefferson the defendants objected to that 
procedure, stating that at that point she should not be 
singled out, and that there was no basis for the inquiry. 
 
After the summations, the situation changed. At that 
point the defendants argued that Jefferson should be 
examined, along with all other jurors, concerning her 
potentially prejudicial comment which Moldow overheard. 
The court offered to do so but after further discussion 
decided to dismiss Jefferson finding that there was no 
reason to question her based upon Moldow's testimony of 
April 16, 1999 because it was clear that Jefferson had not 
been attentive during the closings and should be dismissed 
on that basis. We find that the court's procedure was not 
an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Console, 13 
F.3d 641, 669 n.34 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
C. Whether the court properly instructed the jury on the 
   Hobbs Act. 
 
The defendants challenge the court's instructions to the 
jury on the Hobbs Act Count 6 charge for extortion under 
color of official right, 18 U.S.C. SS 1951(a)(b)(2) and (3) and 
2. They argue that the court improperly refused to charge 
that in a non-campaign case like this one, an express 
agreement must be shown.1 We exercise plenary review on 
this issue. See Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 
128, 135 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The court's instruction was as follows: 
 
        So if a public official agrees explicitly or implicitly to 
       take or withhold some action for the purpose of 
       obtaining money for someone else, that constitutes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Campaign contribution cases present special problems because 
persons who hope that their interests will receive favorable treatment 
from elected officials legitimately may make campaign contributions to 
those officials. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272-73, 
111 S.Ct. 1807, 1816 (1991). 
 
                                10 
  
       extortion. The public official need not fulfill the promise 
       of the payor to do or not to do an official act, although 
       the official's failure to influence may be considered 
       along with all of his conduct in determining whether or 
       not he possessed the intent to commit the crime. The 
       crime is completed at the time when the public official 
       knowingly accepts the benefit in return for his 
       agreement to perform or not to perform an act related 
       to his office. Moreover, the government does not have to 
       prove that there was an express promise on the part of 
       the public official to perform a particular act at the time 
       of the payment. 
 
       In sum then, it is sufficient if the public official 
       understands that he is expected, as a result of the 
       payment, to exercise particular kinds of influence or to 
       do certain things connected with his office as specific 
       opportunities arise. 
 
App. at 6269-70 (emphasis added). 
 
As the government argues, this instruction complies with 
the most recent Supreme Court holding on the issue of 
whether an agreement is required for conviction under the 
Hobbs Act. In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268, 
112 S.Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992), the Supreme Court held that 
"the [g]overnment need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for official acts," in 
order to establish extortion under color of official right 
under the Hobbs Act. Significantly, the Court "reject[ed] 
petitioner's contention that an affirmative step is an 
element of the offense of extortion `under color of official 
right' and need be included in the instruction." Id. 
 
Several courts of appeals also have turned to Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence in Evans to hold specifically that no 
explicit promise is required. In Evans, Justice Kennedy 
wrote that "[t]he official and the payor need not state the 
quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect 
could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods." Id. at 
274, 112 S.Ct. at 1892 (concurring opinion). The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, drawing upon 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, has held that, in non- 
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campaign cases, "proof of an explicit promise to perform the 
official acts in return for the payment is not required." 
United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 731 (2d Cir. 1995); 
see also United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (quid pro quo need not be express; government 
only must show that public official obtained payment to 
which he was not entitled knowing that payment was in 
return for official act). Here, the government proved the 
quid pro quo relationship, though it did not show and did 
not have to show that the defendants had an express 
agreement. 
 
The defendants point to cases from the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit to support their position. Brief at 
36-37. In United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 552-54 
(11th Cir. 1994), the court of appeals held that the district 
court had failed to instruct the jury on the quid pro quo 
relationship, which it construed to mean "explicit promise." 
Yet it noted that in Evans the Supreme Court, in discussing 
an earlier Hobbs Act case, stated that the jury instruction 
satisfied "the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick 
because the offense is completed at the time when the 
public official receives a payment in return for his 
agreement to perform specific official acts[.]" Martinez, 14 
F.3d at 553 (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. at 
1889). In McCormick, "proof of a quid pro quo" is defined as 
a "promise of official action or inaction in exchange for any 
payment or property received." McCormick v. United States, 
500 U.S. 257, 266, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 1813 (1991). The Court 
did not in McCormick, or later in Evans, require an 
"express" or "explicit" promise in cases such as this 
involving payments outside of a campaign contribution 
context. Nevertheless, in United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 
108, 109 (11th Cir. 1994), the court of appeals adhered to 
Martinez. 
 
We will not follow the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit as in our view, as Justice Kennedy explained, a 
conclusion that in a Hobbs Act case the government has to 
demonstrate that the public official made an express 
promise to perform a particular act and that "knowing 
winks and nods" are not sufficient would frustrate the act's 
effect. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274, 112 S.Ct. at 1892 (Kennedy, 
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J., concurring). In the circumstances, we conclude that the 
court's instruction was correct. 
 
D. Defendants' other arguments. 
 
The defendants raise the following additional arguments: 
 
       (1) The district court's erroneous interpretation of the 
       Wire and Mail Fraud Act and improper jury charge 
       violated defendants' federal constitutional rights to due 
       process and to a fair trial; 
 
       (2) The district court's erroneous interpretation of the 
       New Jersey gratuity law and the improper fashioning of 
       a jury charge based upon an incorrect legal analysis 
       violated defendants' federal constitutional right to due 
       process and to a fair trial; 
 
       (3) In violation of defendant Mattison's federal 
       constitutional right to due process and to a fair trial, 
       the district court erred in failing to sever the case 
       against defendant Mattison from the case against 
       defendant Bradley; 
 
       (4) Defendant Mattison's federal, constitutional r ights 
       to due process and to a fair trial and the rights of 
       defendant Mattison under the Federal Sentencing 
       Guidelines were violated by the district court's failure 
       to grant him a downward departure at the time of 
       sentencing; 
 
       (5) Defendant Mattison's federal constitutional right to 
       due process and to a fair trial and the rights of 
       defendant Mattison under the Federal Sentencing 
       Guidelines were violated by the imposition of a two- 
       point increase under an alleged multiple bribe theory; 
 
       (6) Federal constitutional rights to due process a nd to 
       a fair trial were violated by the district court's failure to 
       grant defendants' motion for judgment of acquittal and 
       motion for a new trial. 
 
We have reviewed these contentions and conclude that they 
are clearly without merit and thus we reject the contentions 
without further discussion. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgments of 
conviction and sentence entered July 16, 1997. 
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